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I. Introduction 
At some time in the late 120s AD a certain C. Iulius Theophrastus, citizen of Sparta, during a 
shortage bought grain at the price of 40 denarii per medimnos and then sold it to his fellow-
citizens at a mere 12 denarii per medimnos.
1
 This was still quite expensive, to be sure, but not 
as outrageous as the going scarcity price in the market.  
Theophrastus was not doing something particularly new. Centuries earlier, in 330/29 
BC, an Athenian merchant named Chrysippus and his brother had imported over 10,000 
medimnoi of wheat into Athens and had sold them at „the normal price‟ (ηῆς καθεζηηκσίας 
ηιμῆς) of 5 drachmas per medimnos when the market price had reached 16 drachmas (Dem. 
34.39). Grand Hellenistic civic benefactors such as Protogenes of Olbia and Moschion of 
Priene had likewise provided their fellow-citizens with cheap grain at difficult times (Syll.
3
 
495; I.Priene 108). It is in the Greek cities of Rome‟s eastern provinces during the early and 
high Empire, however, that such practices are particularly well attested. In the inscriptions 
from this period (our chief source of evidence) the phenomenon is usually referred to as 
paraprasis, and somewhat less frequently as parapipraskein, epeuonismos or parapolein. All 
these terms signify the sale at reduced price of foodstuffs, primarily grain, but oil too (both for 
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consumption and gymnasial purposes).
 2
 In the honorific inscriptions in question, parapraseis 
are usually listed among the offices held and the benefactions made by the honorand. This 
would suggest that we might be justified in considering paraprasis as part of the general 
phenomenon of civic euergetism, the exchange of gifts for honours between wealthy citizens 
and their communities so characteristic of Hellenistic and imperial Greek polis culture.
3
 And 
yet, there is something odd about it.  
On the reasonable assumption that euergetism was, among other things, a mechanism 
for converting economic capital (wealth) into symbolic capital (prestige), it seems strange that 
the organisers of parapraseis did not simply give away their grain for free, thus maximising 
their prestige. One could perhaps make some profit by selling instead of donating, especially 
if the price at which one sold the grain was higher than normal (but or course still below the 
current scarcity price, otherwise the sale would not count as a paraprasis), at least if the grain 
came from one‟s own stocks. Paraprasis organisers seem however often to have imported 
their grain
4
, and in that case it is doubtful if there was much profit to be had, especially if the 
scarcity afflicted wide areas and once the cost of transportation is factored in. If profit was the 
main motive, moreover, why not sell at the scarcity price in the first place, or sell in another 
market, where prices might be higher still (as indeed individual elite landowners on occasion 
did –see below)? In addition, as numerous inscriptions testify, local elite benefactors were 
none too stingy or profit-motivated when it came to other forms of munificence, easily 
spending thousands and sometimes even hundreds of thousands of denarii on public buildings, 
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games, festivals and, indeed, public banquets and distributions.
5
 What, then, was the rationale 
behind parapraseis? Profit can, I think, hardly be a satisfactory answer. Instead, we need to 
look for a more systemic explanation, which takes into account various socio-economic, 
political and ideological factors shaping post-Classical polis society, especially during the 
Roman imperial period.  
 
II. Paraprasis and Shortages 
Parapraseis were not exclusively linked to food shortages. For instance, they regularly 
feature as a type of benefaction in inscriptions recording the careers of priests and cult 
personnel associated with the sanctuary of Apollo at Didyma (Miletus) from the late first 
century BC onwards, and the texts in question do not in every case refer to a shortage.
6
 There 
is nothing unusual about this, given that it was not uncommon for priests and priestesses at 
great sanctuaries to provide meals for and distribute olive oil and wine among worshippers, 
particularly during festivals, as, for instance, numerous inscriptions from the sanctuaries of 
Hera and Zeus Panamaros at Stratonikeia testify.
7
 In many texts recording parapraseis, 
however, there are indications that the benefactor‟s sale of foodstuffs at a reduced price 
occurred during a period of serious scarcity. Thus, as we saw, C. Iulius Theophrastus‟ 
paraprasis at Sparta took place during a shortage (ἐν ζπάνει), while a little further on the text 
states that during his career he frequently gave parapraseis „in pressing circumstances‟ (ἐν 
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ηοῖς ἐπείγοσζιν καιροῖς) (lines 15-16). At Beroia in Macedonia during the late first century 
AD, Q. Poppilius Python sold grain at a reduced price during „difficult times‟ (ἐν καιροῖς 
ἀνανκ<α>ίοις, SEG 17.315), while around the same time at Didyma (Miletus) a benefactor 
sold grain and olive oil at a fair price during „troublesome times‟ (ἐν [δσ]ζτε[ρέ]ζι καιροῖς, I. 
Didyma 248, c. AD 50/84). Other texts eschew such rather vague references and are more 
specific. At Metropolis, an unknown benefactor organised parapraseis of grain during 
shortages (ἐν ζειηοδείαις, I.Ephesos 3419). A fragmentary inscription from Argos, dating to 
the reign of Hadrian, shows an agoranomos who had olive oil sold at a reduced price during a 
shortage (ἐν [ἐ]νδείᾳ, BCH 28 (1904) 427-8, no. 10). Other attestations can be found in texts 
from Kolossae (ἐν ζειηοδείᾳ, Robert, Laodicée du Lycos, 277-9, under Hadrian?), Aizanoi (ἐν 
ζιηοδείᾳ, SEG 35.1365, under Hadrian or Antoninus Pius), in Herakleia (ἐν ζπάνει, IG X.2 2 
53, c. AD 100-150) and Lete in Macedonia (ἔν ηε ζειηενδείαις, M.N. Tod, BSA 23 (1918-1919) 
72-81, no. 7, early in the reign of Hadrian), and in Amantia in Illyria ([ἐν δὲ ηῃ ζει]ηοδείᾳ, 
Albania Antica 1 197.19, c. AD 200
8
). In addition there are texts that do not contain a direct 
reference to shortages, but mention a relatively high current price, probably indicating 
scarcity, and then go on to mention the low price at which the benefactor sold.
9
 Thus, even if 
we cannot relate every single instance of paraprasis to an episode of scarcity, there clearly 
existed a strong link between the phenomenon of paraprasis and the vicissitudes of the urban 
food supply. How then should we understand that link? 
                                                 
8
 This inscription does not contain the term paraprasis or any of the other terms referring to the same 
phenomenon listed above, but it is clear from the text that something along the lines of a paraprasis of grain took 
place.   
9
 See e.g. SEG 38.679, Stuberra, Macedonia, AD 74/5, where the olive oil sold at 12 asses per xestes may 
represent a scarcity price; Robert 1937:343-350, no. 4, Sebastopolis, where grain at 4 denarii per kupros is 
probably a scarcity price. 
 5 
 As research during the past few decades has made clear, local and regional food 
shortages were endemic in the ancient Mediterranean, due to regional climatic variation and 
especially the high interannual variability in rainfall.
10
 This meant that good and bad harvests 
alternated in a highly unpredictable manner, with a frequent occurrence of dearth. Poorer 
agriculturally inactive urban inhabitants were particularly at risk. The high inelasticity of 
demand for food and the fact that even during normal years, the urban poor are likely to have 
spent most of their income on purchasing foodstuffs meant that a bad harvest and the resulting 
high prices on the urban grain market could quickly compromise the livelihood of a 
substantial section of the urban population.
11
 Theoretically, of course, an integrated grain 
market might have resolved such problems. Mediterranean regional climatic variability and 
ecological fragmentation meant that shortages in one locality would often occur (roughly) 
simultaneously with gluts in another. The Mediterranean Sea, it has been argued, provided an 
efficient conduit for medium- and long-distance transport of staples (and other types of 
commerce) between Greek and Roman cities clustered around its shores like frogs around a 
pond, ensuring a high level of connectivity.
12
 However, recent in-depth study of grain markets 
in the Roman world has indicated that this level of connectivity should not be overstated. 
Even during the period of political unification within a single Empire that created an 
unrivalled system of trunk roads connecting its many cities, provided a unified legal system 
and a singly currency, and cleared the seas of pirates, grain market integration in the 
Mediterranean region remained relatively low, mainly due to the slowness and high cost of 
transport and communication.
13
 Consequently, to overcome this lack of integration and 
forcefully match supply to demand in case of shortages required the intervention and agency 
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 6 
of powerful, wealthy individuals and groups involved in extensive interregional elite networks, 
emperors, governors, but above all, local urban elites. The economic misery created by 
shortages could (and did) easily translate into social unrest, protests and riots that had the 
potential to undermine urban social and political stability, and, most importantly, endanger the 
position of the urban elite. Hence urban elites in particular would be strongly motivated to 
intervene, and like their counterparts in many other pre-modern urbanised societies, that is 
exactly what they did. 
The people, moreover, also expected elites to intervene. This has become particularly 
clear from research on early modern European food riots, which often resulted not from 
scarcities per se, but from a perceived disregard, by elites, for what the social historian E.P. 
Thompson has called „the moral economy.‟14 This term refers to a pattern of expectations and 
assumptions among the populace based on past behaviour of elites and governments in times 
of scarcity (or at least collective memories infused with moral ideals about the correct 
behaviour of authorities in such circumstances). Studying eighteenth-century English food 
riots, Thompson found that protesters often focussed on what they perceived as a breach of 
customary, fair regulation of the grain market that ensured prices were reasonable and the 
poor received their share, regulation which in the recent past had been supported by the 
aristocracy and the government. The liberalisation of the British grain market however started 
to erode such upper-class/governmental support, resulting, in times of shortage, in popular 
demands that the elite once again take up its paternalistic role.
15
 Approaching the topic of 
food riots from a different angle, that of European state formation, the sociologist Charles 
Tilly came to a similar conclusion:  
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On the whole rebellions did not occur when people were hungriest, but when people 
saw that officials were failing to apply the standard controls, tolerating profiteering or, 
worst of all, authorizing shipments of precious local grain to other places.
16
 
 
The same mechanism was also at work in food riots in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
(Qing) China, where “not simply the quality of the harvest [was at issue], but whether the 
people controlling supplies would make grain available on terms and in quantities demanded 
by people expecting their needs to be met.”17  
In the Greco-Roman world, a similar pattern of expectations existed among urban 
populations regarding the behaviour of authorities in the event of scarcity.
18
 This can be seen 
from the fact that when faced with shortages, urban populations generally did not vent their 
displeasure on the economic actors in the market (traders, bakers, food-sellers) but turned to 
the authorities, local elites, city magistrates, provincial governors, kings or emperors.
19
 For 
their part, ancient elites and rulers generally seem to have shared the urban masses‟ vision of a 
morally just food market (which did however not always prevent individual large landowners 
from profiteering at the people‟s expense, through speculative hoarding or export of local 
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supplies to high-price regions –see below).20 As a leading citizen of Prusa in Bithynia, Dio 
Chrysostom, accused, apparently wrongfully, of grain price speculation, remarked to the 
popular assembly, the people‟s demand for “supervision of your market” was “the course of 
sensible human beings, and in this no-one will oppose you” (Or. 46.14).21 All this has 
prompted Paul Erdkamp to argue that the notion of a „moral economy‟, interpreted broadly, 
was as applicable to the ancient food markets as to early modern European ones.
22
  
In the ancient world, furthermore, especially at the urban level, the expectations of the 
moral economy were mediated through, and reinforced, by what we may call the entitlements 
of citizenship. In the Greek polis (and Roman civitas), the shared citizenship of richer and 
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poorer citizens had always provided a strong normative framework for interactions between 
mass and elite. Rich citizens were expected to use (part of) their wealth to contribute to the 
well being of the citizen community as a whole.
23
 It is within this broad ideological 
framework, sometimes referred to as the „civic model of society‟, that we should interpret 
both the liturgy system of Classical democratic Athens as well as the public benefactions 
(euergetism) of elite citizens in the poleis of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, even if, in 
these later periods, the ideology acquired a more specifically paternalist flavour (see below).
24
 
In fact, it is euergetism that underscores particularly well the continuing centrality of this civic 
ideology in the poleis of the high imperial era: recorded public benefactions from this period 
are almost always targeted primarily at the citizen community to which the donor belonged.
25
 
As argued above, it is this same civic ideology, incorporating the notion of a moral 
economy, that provides the backdrop to the measures urban elites took to protect ordinary 
citizens from the volatility of grain prices caused by harvest fluctuations: just as individual 
elite citizens were expected to be publicly generous, so the elite as a collective were expected 
to make an effort to protect their fellow-citizens from starvation. In return, they received 
honours, prestige, and, as a group, were confirmed in the legitimacy of their exalted position. 
The measures civic elites took, which include outlawing exports, stimulating imports, 
negotiating floor and ceiling prices, fixing price levels (generally of bread) as well as setting 
up civic grain funds and, occasionally, publicly funded distributions, are attested in Greek 
poleis from the Archaic period until the later Roman empire, and have often been discussed.
26
 
Particularly striking during the Roman imperial period are the municipal grain funds set up by 
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many poleis throughout the eastern provinces (and arguably also by cities in the Roman 
West).
27
 Interestingly, most such funds seem to have been cash reserves, as the sources make 
clear, managed by annually appointed officials, generally called sitonai in the East. Their 
main task seems to have been to decide annually whether, given the current market situation, 
it was opportune to use the fund to import grain from abroad and distribute it among the 
citizens (for free or at a low price).
28
  
My argument would now be that paraprasis as a measure to counter high grain (or oil) 
prices fits in broadly with this whole range of strategies adopted by urban elites to shield 
citizens from the effects of price volatility. That in the case of municipal grain funds, the 
money to buy grain abroad mostly came from (probably largely tax-based
29
) civic income, 
while in the case of parapraseis, the cash was furnished by the organiser does not matter 
much. Indeed, the funds available to sitonai might also be a mix of public and private monies, 
given that sitonai occasionally made contributions to the grain funds from their own resources, 
as did other members of the elite.
30
 What mattered, and what is underscored by this evident 
mixture of public, governmental care and private euergetism is that from the perspective of 
the mass of ordinary citizens, the elite were seen to be taking their responsibility for the 
welfare of the citizen community as a whole. Whether they did this as private euergetists or as 
civic magistrates was of little importance within the ideological framework of the civic model: 
it is significant, in this respect, that some donors organised their parapraseis while they were 
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sitones or agoranomos, while others did not.
31
 Moreover, by making the grain or other 
foodstuffs available at an artificially low price during periods of scarcity, organisers of 
parapraseis, sitonai and price-fixing agoranomoi were conforming exactly to what according 
to Thompson and other scholars was a central aspect of the „moral economy‟, namely the 
expectation among ordinary consumers that elites and governments would take care to ensure 
„just prices‟ in the food market. The expectation that elites or rulers would ensure fair food 
prices is well attested in pre-modern urbanised societies, including the Greco-Roman world, 
and it is I think one important reason why organisers of parapraseis sold the produce they 
made available, rather than give it away for free.
 32
 As members of the urban elite, they had to 
be seen to care about the morally just operation of the food market, and what better way was 
there to demonstrate concern for one‟s fellow-citizens in this respect then to sell one‟s grain at 
an eminently „just‟ (i.e. low) price during a period of scarcity?  
 
III. Paraprasis and Euergetism 
Another reason why paraprasis organisers sold their grain or oil instead of donating it may 
have to do with the overall character of civic euergetism. Benefactors mostly gave to their 
fellow-citizens, not to the poor per se.
33
 More specifically, they generally gave most to those 
people or groups within the citizenry who could offer something substantial in return. In 
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Classical democratic Athens, the entire citizen collective, including the poor, was sufficiently 
politically empowered, through the sovereign assembly and the popular law courts, to be able 
to offer serious political, social and courtroom advantages to generous liturgists.
34
 In the more 
oligarchic poleis of the later Hellenistic and Roman imperial periods, though the popular 
assemblies remained an important element in local politics, citizens were no longer as 
politically equal and entitled as they had been in Classical Athens. Magistracies and council 
membership were now the prerogative of the wealthy, who in the imperial period came to 
constitute an ordo decurionum (bouleutic order) along broadly Roman lines.
35
 Yet we also 
witness an increasing tendency towards the formation of different status groups among the 
non-elite citizenry.
36
 Such citizen-subgroups included the urban professional middle strata, to 
whom the Romans referred as the plebs media, who provided the membership for the 
professional collegia that flourished in the poleis under Roman rule, and who constituted a 
dominant force in the popular assemblies, but also several less well understood status groups, 
who in our epigraphic sources are distinguished from the politai, the ordinary citizens.
37
 Such 
higher status groups will have had more political influence than mere politai (think of the 
dominance of the plebs media stratum in the assemblies), and, along with the councillors, they 
are therefore likely to have been crucial voices in the decision-making process leading up the 
awarding of honours and privileges to elite benefactors. Consequently, they were a prime 
target of munificence.  
This can be seen very clearly in euergetic distributions, which often included per 
capita handouts of grain, oil, wine and/or money. Commonly, the councillors received most, 
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with gerousiasts (who often included a „plebeian‟ element among their membership38) 
frequently coming second. It is noteworthy however that in many such distributions, higher 
status citizen-subgroups (e.g. ekklesiastai
39
, collegiati) are distinguished from, and receive 
larger handouts, than those just designated politai.
40
 If my interpretation of parapraseis as 
part of the general armoury of elite strategies for food market regulation is along the right 
track, however, then the aim of a paraprasis would have been to make grain or other 
foodstuffs cheaply available to as large a number of urban inhabitants as possible, including 
the poorest sections of the community, just as an agoranomos, during a festival, might set a 
maximum price for bread for both citizens and visiting foreigners, whose presence during the 
festival days might otherwise drive up prices too much. From the perspective of the 
paraprasis organiser, selling then made more sense than donating, since he was partly 
targeting groups that were of relatively low status and poor, had little influence in the polis 
and could thus offer little in return.  
Moreover, providing such large numbers of people with a substantial amount of free 
grain or other free foodstuffs for a prolonged period of time (several months perhaps, until the 
new harvest was in) would probably have been beyond the means of most elite individuals, 
except perhaps in the smallest of poleis, or if the donor belonged to the few superrich. 
Supporting even a small city population of 5,000 at subsistence level for one year might easily 
cost the equivalent of 140,000 denarii or more.
41
 Gifts of such magnitude (equivalent in value 
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to more than five times the official property requirement for a city councillor) are relatively 
scarce in our records.
42
 Organisers of parapraseis of course sold their grain instead of 
distributing it freely. Still it often had to be purchased at a scarcity price first, and then 
transported to the city. For such reasons, the costs involved in providing a lot of people with a 
lot of dearly bought grain at a low price for a long period of time might be very substantial too. 
The inscriptions do not provide much help here. They rarely mention the actual amounts of 
grain or other foodstuffs sold at parapraseis, or how many people benefited, to what extent, 
and for how long. One uncharacteristically precise text from Sebastopolis mentions that a 
paraprasis organiser made available 2,000 kuproi of grain.
43
 This equals 4,000 modii, or 
26,200 kg: on average some 5 kg per person if we assume a fairly broad group of, say, 5,000 
individual buyers.
44
 The grain was purchased at 4 denarii per kupros, and sold for 2 denarii 
per kupros, which brings the total expenditure of the organiser to 8,000 denarii, and his loss 
after sale to 4,000 denarii. If this text is in any way representative, it might be assumed that 
most parapraseis were in fact short term emergency measures. Parapraseis could reach a 
large number of people, but their long-term effects on the food market were probably limited. 
However, their ideological significance, as public gestures by members of the civic elite, 
might indeed be substantial, and for this paper, that is the crucial issue. 
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course, reducing the number of people who had access to the cheap grain increases the average amount available 
for each person to buy. 
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IV. Paraprasis and Speculation 
The specific character of paraprasis may also have been determined partly by a phenomenon 
that was in many ways its precise opposite, i.e. grain price speculation. As Peter Garnsey has 
written, the class that produced the benefactors also produced the speculators.
45
 It was very 
profitable for large landowners, especially during lean years, to hoard part of their produce in 
the hope of driving up prices, or to hold on to (part of) their stocks for sale in another city or 
region where prices were higher (provided that the profits achieved outweighed transport 
costs). As was the case with paraprasis itself, there was nothing new about such speculative 
behaviour. Solon‟s early sixth-century BC reform package at Athens, for instance, arguably 
included a law banning all exports except olive oil (Plut., Solon 24), which has been 
interpreted as „an ad hoc measure issued in the context of a food crisis‟, a „shortage 
aggravated by unscrupulous landowners who were sending their grain abroad in search of 
higher prices.‟ Similarly, from fourth-century BC Selybria near Byzantium we know of a law, 
probably enacted during a food crisis, explicitly forbidding the export of grain (Ps.-Aristotle, 
Oec. 1348b33).
46
 A list of curses from early fifth-century BC Teos even contains a passage in 
which death is wished upon anyone who forces up the price of grain.
47
  
A string of anecdotes from Roman times, particularly from the East, confirms that 
such speculation was by no means absent among elite landowners in the empire‟s provincial 
cities.
48
 It is hard to prove whether the phenomenon was actually more common under the 
                                                 
45
 Garnsey 1988: 82. 
46
 Garnsey 1988: 74-5, 110-13. 
47
 Meiggs and Lewis 30, side A, ll. 6-11. 
48
 See e.g. Cic., Att. 5.21 (Cicero as governor of Cilicia in 51/0 BC during a shortage persuades local landowners 
to release their stored grain); Cic., Flacc. 17 (Athenagoras of Kyme is punished by a local court for exporting 
grain during a shortage); Phil., Vita Ap. 1.15 (At Aspendus in Pamphylia under Tiberius, wealthy landowners 
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Empire than in previous periods, yet if we take into consideration that most preserved 
attestations were probably preserved because they refer to relatively exceptional interventions 
by governors, emperors, and, on one occasion, a miracle worker, into conflicts surrounding 
speculative hoarding, it seems a safe assumption that the practice was more prevalent than the 
sources suggest.  
Also, circumstances were conducive. There was now the political integration into a 
single empire with the associated benefits of easier movement of people, goods and 
information, which made selling abroad a more realistic option for enterprising landlords 
(though we should not overstate the level of market integration, see above). Also, the political 
transformation of the eastern urban elites into veritable ordines decurionum under Roman 
aegis, widening the power gap between mass and elite, might lead many a notable to conclude 
that he could get away with self enrichment somewhat easier. At the same time, however, this 
political transformation had taken place within the confines of a polis society structured 
around the notion of a citizen community. The resulting tensions were defused in a 
proliferation of munificence through which wealthy and powerful notables strove to 
                                                                                                                                                        
create or aggravate a food shortage by holding onto their stocks of grain for export; wonder-worker Apollonius 
intervenes and can only just save the life of a local magistrate about to be burned alive by an irate crowd); Petr., 
Sat. 44 (wealthy hoarders, aediles and bakers are accused of colluding to keep bread prices high. Fictional, but 
perhaps not unrealistic); Abbott-Johnson 65a = Freis 65 (during a shortage in AD 93, the governor of 
Cappadocia L. Antistius Rusticus orders those with stocks of grain in Pisidian Antioch to bring it onto the 
market); Dio Chrys., Or. 46.8 (Dio Chysostom, local landowner and notable of Prusa in Bithynia, is accused of 
speculatively hoarding grain so as to drive up the price, but denies the accusation); P. Oxy. 3048 (March AD 246: 
the local government buys up stocks of grain from landowners in the Oxyrhynchite nome to relieve the city 
during what was probably a severe shortage, after compelling them first to register their hoards. The whole 
situation suggests that those holding on to stocks were not (yet) inclined to sell of their own accord); Libanius, 
Or. 18.195 (AD 362: shortages at Syrian Antioch because of a „bad season‟ and speculative hoarding by the 
city‟s elite; the emperor Julian intervenes). 
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emphasise their good citizenship in exchange for prestige and legitimation of their position, 
and by means of a paternalist civic ideology according to which the rich were supposed to 
take care of their ordinary fellow-citizens (see above).
49
  
This paternalism found its institutional incarnation in the various measures civic elites 
took to protect the citizenry against the extremes of grain price volatility, as we saw. As a 
group, elites had every reason to resent the mavericks from their own circle who risked 
disrupting social harmony for their own private advantage. Yet for those elite individuals 
seeking symbolic rather than pecuniary profits, what better statement was their against such 
un-civic, unscrupulous and uncaring profiteering from the plight of the ordinary citizenry than 
actually making one‟s grain available to all and sundry at a spectacularly low price? 
Speculative hoarding was the ultimate negation of the elite‟s „duty‟ to ensure fair prices on the 
food market, whereas paraprasis was its ultimate confirmation. In an age when euergetism 
and a paternalist attitude were so highly rewarded, in terms of privileges, honours and prestige 
granted by the people, the food price speculation practised by some of the wealthy must have 
provided others elite individuals with a strong incentive towards paraprasis. 
 
V. Food-related Munificence, Civic Ideology and Intra-elite Politics 
The argument developed in the previous section might go some way towards explaining why 
many attestations of paraprasis date to the Roman imperial period. At the same time, 
however, it begs a large question regarding paraprasis and other forms of food-related 
munificence during this same period: why, if these types of gifts so well fitted the political 
and ideological climate of the age, are they not far more widely attested? Food-related gifts 
are on record, to be sure, even, occasionally, in respectable numbers, yet as a percentage of 
recorded euergetic gifts from the early and high empire they do not stand out. In one 
                                                 
49
 Zuiderhoek 2008b, 2009. 
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collection of over 500 (mostly) epigraphically recorded gifts from Roman Asia Minor, they 
make up only some three per cent of all gifts.
50
 Especially plain gifts of grain by local elite 
benefactors to cities are thin on the ground, as Garnsey has noted too: „Euergetists rarely gave 
grain away.‟51 Why? Above we have explored several reasons why it might be in the interest 
of paraprasis organisers to sell their grain rather than give it away for free. These already 
provide some clues, yet a broader argument is still required. 
One possible explanation for the general paucity of food-related gifts in eastern 
provincial munificence can be found, I think, in the combined effects of then-current 
ideological ideals and the realities of intra-elite politics in the imperial Greek cities. In Greek 
honorific inscriptions from the high empire benefactors continue to be addressed in a 
discourse of praise that is decidedly civic, stressing classic virtues of the good (rich) polis 
citizen as motives for munificence, i.e. megalophrosyne, megaloprepeia, megalopsychia, 
eunoia pros ton demon and so forth. At the same time, as suggested earlier, a notion of 
paternalism developed that had remained largely below the surface in the democratic polis 
politics of the Classical and early Hellenistic periods, when it was the demos that politically 
controlled the generosity of the rich, as in the liturgy system at Athens. In the high empire, 
local elite benefactors were increasingly addressed as „fathers/mothers of the polis‟, 
(pater/meter tes poleos). Younger members might earn the epithet „son‟ or „daughter of the 
polis‟ (huios/thugater tes poleos), in addition to being praised for their civic virtue.52 This of 
course cast their ordinary fellow-citizens in the role of „children‟ from whom obedience might 
be demanded, yet the metaphor cuts both ways: the elite was not just expected to be generous, 
but had a moral („parental‟) obligation to care. No type of munificence, therefore, fitted this 
                                                 
50
 Zuiderhoek 2008a: 172; 2009. 
51
 Garnsey 1988: 83. 
52
 Robert 1969: 827n1; Veyne 1976: 313, 342n146, See also Veyne 1983: 26 on the civic elite: „La cité est leur 
famille‟; Panagopoulos 1977: 214-216; Van Rossum 1988: 152-154; in particular also Pleket 1998: 212-215.    
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ideological climate better than gifts of food, for what would be more praiseworthy, and more 
natural, for parents than to do their utmost best to feed their children?
53
 Hence no type of gift 
would arguably earn a benefactor more immediate popularity, more prestige, and more 
renown. And, for oligarchic civic elites whose political effectiveness depended on not letting 
internal power struggles get so far out of hand as to weaken the internal cohesion of the group, 
that was precisely the problem. Allowing some of their number to stick their head above the 
parapet this far might crucially weaken the position of the group as a whole.  
The obvious analogy is with the city of Rome, another community with a decidedly 
oligarchic elite, where pious tales were told in later centuries about one Spurius Maelius who 
was executed on the accusation of aiming for kingship in the fourth century BC after 
providing the populace of Rome with grain on his own initiative (Livy 4.13-16; Dion. Hal. 
12.1.1-4), where the tribune Gaius Gracchus got into trouble in 123 BC over, among other 
things, his grain provision scheme for the urban plebs (Plut., C. Gracch. 5), and where the 
emperors from Augustus onwards were adamant that control over the annona should be theirs 
and theirs alone (e.g. Tac., Ann. 3.54). Governmental views on munificence, or ideas echoing 
such views, among them those of Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom referring to the imperial 
Greek East, betray a similar nervousness about the runaway popularity of those benefactors 
who gave exactly, or too much, of what the people wanted. Buildings were fine, except 
(amhpi)theatres (notably also a problem in Republican Rome
54
), but with regard to games, 
                                                 
53
 Zuiderhoek 2008a: 175-177. 
54
 The Republican senatorial oligarchy for a long time prevented any of their number from constructing a 
permanent stone theatre at Rome, for fear that a project of this kind would render the donor such enduring 
popularity that he would become a threat to his peers. See Holleran 2003: 52-54 for references and discussion. 
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festivals, shows, distributions and banquets (especially when involving large numbers of 
ordinary citizens), there is much ambivalence in our sources.
55
  
We might well imagine, in this context, that outright gifts of food to the populace by 
private individuals, given their huge symbolic significance and their focus on the most 
immediate material needs of the masses, were regarded with especially deep suspicion among 
urban political elites, as the analogy with the city of Rome also suggests. Here, then, is one 
possible explanation of why grain was rarely given away straight. Viewed from this 
perspective, the specific character of several frequently attested forms of food (grain)-related 
munificence is informative. Distributions, for instance: when grain was distributed among the 
people, often alongside money handouts, the distribution generally followed the social 
hierarchy, with ordinary citizens receiving least (see above).
56
 Thus, most of the distributions 
that we do see in the sources actually re-emphasise and reinforce the political status quo, 
which of course from the perspective of the elite as a group could only be a good thing.
57
 
                                                 
55
 Note e.g. Dig. 50.8.6 and 50.10.3, which express Roman governmental concern about local expenditures on 
theatres, amphitheatres and games and shows eroding civic funds and causing rivalry and sedition; Plut., Mor. 
821f-822a, 822f-823a, 823d-e, where the aspiring polis politician is warned that donating gladiatorial games, 
theatre shows, distributions and banquets leads to unproductive competition among the elite and produces only 
ephemeral popularity with the masses; note esp. 822a: members of the elite „should realise that they are 
destroying themselves when they buy prestige through great expenditures, thus making the masses strong and 
bold in the thought that they have the power to give and take away something important.‟(Loeb tr.); Dio Chrys., 
Or. 40, 45 and 47 are eloquent testimony to the sort of vicious intra-elite conflicts that munificence-based 
popularity might arouse. See Zuiderhoek 2007 for further references and discussion. 
56
 Rogers 1991: ch. 2; Van Nijf 1997: 149-188; Zuiderhoek 2009: 86-107, esp. table 5.2. For a clear example see 
IGR 3.802 (Sillyon). 
57
 Note that distributions to large numbers of ordinary citizens indiscriminately are regarded as a „corrupt 
practice‟ in Pliny‟s correspondence with Trajan, see Ep. 10.116-117. 
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Contributions to the municipal grain fund are another example: these, we might argue, 
were acceptable, because they supported the very structures the elite as a collective had set up 
to protect ordinary citizens from exorbitant food prices. The same, of course, was true of 
paraprasis. Though organised by individual elite members, parapraseis, as I have argued 
above, were structurally entirely in line with the collective policy of urban elites, expressed 
via the workings of municipal grain funds and the actions of agoranomoi, to maintain 
acceptable („just‟) prices for foodstuffs on the city markets.  
Naturally, politically and economically powerful elite individuals could and did 
occasionally break the informal consensus on gifts of food (just as they might sometimes 
ignore the demands of the moral economy and hoard their grain to make a killing in a scarcity 
market at home or abroad). Then they organised lavish public banquets for the entire populace, 
or gave away their grain, oil or wine indiscriminately. But, and that is the crux of the matter, 
they did so not nearly as often as we would expect them to.
58
  
 
VI. Conclusion 
To sum up: parapraseis were certainly considered acts of munificence by the citizens of 
Roman-era Greek poleis (as they were in earlier periods). They were viewed as part and 
parcel of the general pattern of „honourable behaviour‟ ideally displayed by the good rich 
citizen of the late Hellenistic and Roman imperial Greek polis, as revealed to us by countless 
honorific inscriptions: multiple office holding and unreserved use of one‟s private wealth for 
the benefit of the community through generous liturgies and benefactions. Yet parapraseis 
did have some peculiar characteristics. The reason for this, as I have tried to argue in this 
paper, is that they directly concerned the supply of food and its distribution through the urban 
                                                 
58
 It is noteworthy in this respect that many public banquets in the Greek poleis during the Roman imperial 
period were also organised along decidedly hierarchical lines, see Van Nijf 1997: 156-188. 
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market and thus touched on one of the most sensitive political and economic issues in ancient 
urban life. 
Two forces impacted upon the structure and frequency of food-related munificence, 
parapraseis in particular. The first was what scholars have termed the „moral economy‟ of the 
food market, the general expectation among the urban masses in many pre-modern societies, 
Greece and Rome as well as imperial China and early modern Europe, that political and 
governmental elites would take care to ensure the „just‟ working of the food market, insuring 
the masses against starvation by, for instance, keeping prices at an acceptable level and 
organising emergency supplies as and when the need arose. Failure of elites to live up to these 
expectations would quickly result in riots, disturbances and general socio-political instability, 
as many studies show. In the Roman East, urban elites, to avoid such troubles, set up 
municipal grain funds and as office holders, agoranomoi or sitonai, tried to ensure a steady 
supply of grain and its sale at a fair price. As individual benefactors, they often tailored their 
food-related gifts to the system they had set up as a collective, by, for instance, contributing to 
the municipal grain fund, or, significantly, by selling their grain at a low price to as a large a 
section of the urban populace as possible in times of dearth, thus living up most empathically 
to the demands of the moral economy. In this way, they could also make a strong political and 
ideological statement against those mavericks from their own circle who ignored the moral 
economy and tried to profit from scarcity by speculatively hoarding their grain. 
The second force impacting upon parapraseis and other forms of food-related 
munificence was intra-elite competition and rivalry. In a civic world where rich citizens won 
and legitimated their power through gifts to the community and were a paternalist ideology 
underwrote elite dominance, outright gifts of food could make one individual benefactor 
dangerously popular and influential with the masses. This might well explain both why food-
related gifts are relatively scarce in our records (i.e. compared to other types of benefactions), 
 23 
and why those food-related gifts that we do find are often politically „neutralised‟ to some 
extent, reinforcing the political status quo, as in the case of hierarchically structured handouts, 
or underscoring the collective elite efforts to ensure a steady supply and fair distribution of 
food in the polis, as in the case of gifts to the municipal grain fund, and of course, parapraseis. 
The conclusion we might draw from this is that paraprasis, both in terms of the frequency of 
its occurrence and in terms of its characteristics as a form of munificence, was as much a 
product of the internal socio-political dynamics of polis society, especially during the later 
Hellenistic and Roman imperial periods, as of the (mal)functioning of urban food markets.  
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